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Chapter 1
Chapter 1:
introduction
1.1 Problem statement
Poverty is a hot
problem to every country in the world, especially to developing countries.
Unemployment and low productivity or low income, vulnerability and
under-empowerment are considered proximate determinants of poverty (Khandker,
1998; World Bank, 2000). In developing countries, such as Vietnam, poverty is
caused by insufficiency of both physical and human capital, especially physical
capital. Lack of savings and capital makes it difficult for many poor people who
want jobs in the farm and non-farm sectors to become self-employed and undertake
productive income-generating activities. Providing credit seems to be a good way
to generate self-employment opportunities for the poor. However, as the poor
lack physical collaterals, they rarely access to formal credit institutions. In
developing countries, informal lenders dominate credit-providing activities to
the poor although the interest rate they charge the poor is much higher than the
formal, preventing poor rural households from investing in income-generating
activities (Adams and Fitchett 1992; Ghates 1992). Many of microfinance or
microcredit programs provide small amount of credit through social mechanism
such as group-based lending to reach the poor and other clients, including
women, who lack access to formal financial institutions (Huppi and Feder, 1990;
Holt and Ribe, 1991; Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Von Pischke, Adams and
Donald, 1983; Yaron, 1994; Khandker, 1998). It is generally accepted that
microfinance or microcredit programs are able to reach the poor at affordable
cost and thus help the poor become self-employed (World Bank, 1990; Binswanger
Landell-Mills, 1995).
However, there
still exist different views on the role of microfinance in poverty reduction,
which remain only partial and contested. At one extreme are writers who doubt
the optimistic view on such initiatives and try to prove negative impacts that
microfinance can have (Adams and Von Pischke, 1992; Montgomery, 1996).
Microfinance has been considered as a social liability, consuming scarce
resources without affecting long-term outcomes by such detractors. Moreover,
even if microfinance programs are able to reach the poor but they may not be
cost –effective.
At the other are
studies arguing that microfinance has very beneficial economic and social
impacts (Hossain, 1988; Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Schuler, Hashemi and Riley,
1996). These proponents of microfinance consider promoting the poor’s access to
credit as an important means of ending poverty as argued by Yunus (1983).
In the middle is
work that identifies the beneficial impacts of microfinance but argues that
microfinance doesn't help the poorest of the poor (Hulme and Mosley, 1996).
In Vietnam,
microfinance has been done for years in light of poverty alleviation. The
pioneers introducing microfinance in terms of Savings and Credit Programs in
Vietnam are NGOs. They have applied the group-lending model of Grameen Bank (see
section 2.1.2.1) to implement such schemes. After that this model is replicated
in terms of the linking bank between NGOs and VPA, VBP, PCF’s. There have been a
number of impact evaluations of microfinance (savings and credit activities) on
poverty reduction in terms of income, productivity and other socio-economic
impacts (Alana Albee, 1996; Le Thanh Tam, 1999; Pham Thi Lan, 2000; Dang Ngoc
Quang et al., 2000; Trinh Thi Thu Huong, 2000 and so on). However, all those
lack a consistency in the conceptual and analytical framework for impact
assessment. Moreover, except the assessment done by Le Thanh Tam, all of
those seem to be done in descriptive ways. Especially, the analyses have
largely failed to indicate whether the measured benefits are due to program
participation. On the other hand, they haven’t taken into account the
different effects of microfinance on different levels of poverty or define who
among the poor benefit from microfinance.
1.2
Focus of the study
The study focuses
on the impact of savings and credit program done by Save for the Children Fund
of United Kingdom in Cam Xuyen district, Ha Tinh on three aspects including
imcome improvement, vulnerability reduction, and empowerment.
1.3
Research questions
The study attempts
to answer following questions:
- Do the poor and very poor account for a significant share of total SCF members? Why
or why not?
- Do the members become better-off after taking SCF loans in terms of income
improvement, vulnerability reduction and empowerment?
- Do the members of SCF become better-off after involving in the Savings and Credit
Scheme than the non-members?
- Is there any difference in level of benefit between members with different levels
of wealth?
1.4
Data
To answer the
above sub-questions, data will be taken from the author’s own household survey
on members and non-members of SCF in 5 communes of Cam Xuyen district, Ha Tinh
province as well as their baseline data collected in the beginning of the scheme
in each commune provided by SCF.
1.5
Methodology
The impacts of
microfinance will be analyzed in terms of income changes, vulnerability
reduction and empowerment using descriptive and comparative methods. In
addition, an econometric model will be also applied to assess the impact of
microfinance on income increase.
1.6
Thesis structure
Chapter 2 provides
a detailed conceptual and analytical framework of the microfinance's impact on
poverty reduction as well as literature review concentrating on the issues that
will be explored in the subsequent chapter. Chapter 3 goes into the analysis of
poverty and SCF's savings and credit program in Cam Xuyen district, Ha Tinh
province. Chapter 4 moves on to an analysis of the poverty-impact of the scheme
in terms of income improvement, vulnerability reduction and empowerment in this
area. Based upon the analysis in the previous chapter, some conclusions and
recommendations are drawn in the last chapter.
chapter 2:
conceptual and analytical framework
2.1Conceptual Framework
2.1.1
Poverty and Its Causes
2.1.1.1 The
Definition of Poverty
Poverty is meant
as the deprivation in well-being: low income, low achievement in health and
education, vulnerability to shocks and powerlessness as well as voicelessness.
2.1.1.2
Causes of Poverty
According to the
World Bank (2000), there are three main causes of poverty as follows:
·
Lack
of income and assets to attain basic necessities: food, shelter, clothing,
acceptable health and education.
·
Sense of voicelessness and powerlessness in the institution of state and
society.
·
Vulnerability to adverse shocks, linked to an inability to cope with them.
All three causes
relates to each other, preventing the poor from participating income-generating
opportunities, making them unable to cope with risk, pushing them into severe
poverty.
2.1.2 The
Conceptual Framework of Microfinance on Poverty Reduction
2.1.2.1 The
Concept of Microfinance
Microfinance is
the provision of very small loans that are repaid within short periods of time,
and is essentially used by low income individuals and households who have few
assets that can be used as collaterals aimed at helping them start up or expand
small income generating activities. As the time passes by, microfinance goes
beyond credit and includes the provision of a broad range of other financial
services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and
insurance to the poor and low-income households and micro-enterprises who are
unmet by the formal commercial financial institutions.
Microfinance
services are provided by three types of sources: formal institutions,
semi-formal institutions such as NGOs, and informal sources such as money
lenders and shopkeepers. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are refered as
institutions whose major business is the provision of microfinance services.
Institutional microfinance is defined to include microfinance services provided
by both formal and semi-formal institutions.
2.1.2.2 The
Conceptual Framework of Microfinance on Poverty Reduction
2.1.2.2.1 Basic
Model
When the household
saves, it will have to forgone the consumption in the current period and be able
to earn interest. But if it borrows, the cost incurred by the household is the
interest rate and transaction costs.
To reduce risk caused by the loan, the borrower tends to diversify their
income-generating activities, thereby stabilizing their income or smoothing
their consumption. These examples highlight the demand of households for
microfinance in order to stabilize consumption, and increase income or the
impact of microfinance on poverty reduction.
Assuming that the
life of a household is divided in two stages: current stage and future stage.
For convenience, the household is assumed to inherit no assets and finish its
life with no assets either. It has an endowment E as shown in Figure 2.1 with
current and future income Y1, Y2, respectively.
Supposing the
household borrower, hereafter borrower, is rational. He likes more to less,
i.e., the more goods he obtains, the more satisfaction or utility
U he gets. He tries to make his consumption smoothing and to maximize from
consumption over two periods C1, C2 as the following
equation:
Max U = Max {U(C1
, C2)}
(2.1)
The household's
utility curves are assumed to be convex and non-intersective each other. Denote
S1 is the difference between Y1 and C1. If S1
is negative, it means that the household is dissaving. The borrower has to
borrow amount of S1 at an interest rate, say, r. If S1
is positive, the household is saving at the lending interest rate, say, r.
Because the household is assumed to die with no assets at the end of the second
stage, so:
C2 = Y2
+ (Y1 - C1)*(1+r)
(2.2)
Taking W as the
wealth or household budget expressed in period 1, we have:
(2.3)
Using the Lagrange
method for extreme value with assuming that it is no limit for the household to
make borrowing, the maximization of the utility function equation (2.1) subject
to the intertemporal budget constraint as shown in equation (2.3) can be
rewritten as follows:
(2.4)
In which
l
is Lagrange multiplier

Figure 2.1: The impact of savings and credit on consumption
Period 1>
Taking
the first derivatives of function L for C1, C2 and
applying the first conditions of extreme value, we have:
(2.5)
(2.6)
Solving
equation (2.5) for the Lagrange multiplier and substituting it into equation
(2.6) yields the following relationship between marginal utility of consumption
in each period or the absolute marginal utility rate of substitution:
(2.7)
While the slope of
budget constraint line SL is:
Slope = tg = (1+r)
(2.8)
From two above
equations (2.7) and (2.8), it turns out to be that the utility gets maximum when
the marginal utility rate of substitution equals to the slope of the budget
constraint line. This is reflected in Figure 2.1 by the tangency between the
utility curve U2 with the budget constraint line SL.
If the household
can’t access to credit and savings, it consumes no more than the amount of
income in each period. In this case, if the utility curve is tangent to the
intertemporal budget line, the household gets maximum utility. However, the fact
is not always the case. Frequently, consumption at endowment E, the utility
curve cuts the intertemporal budget line, i.e., the household doesn’t optimize
its consumption to get its maximum utility. If the household can access to
savings and credit, it means that it is possible for the household to consume
more than the amount of income in each period, or to earn income from income
left after consumption. Thus. the household can maximize its utility by
efficiently allocating consumption in each period. In Figure 2.1, this is
reflected by the move of utility curve from lower utility curve U1 to higher
utility curve U2.
In summary, this simple model proves that access to credit and savings is able
to increase the household's utility by optimally allocating consumption over
time. As consequence, it implies that households tend to demand financial
service for maximizing their welfare and they are willing to pay a certain price
for them.
2.1.2.2.2
Positive Impacts of Microfinance
v Improved Income Generation
Income can be
improved thanks to microfinance through several ways as follow:
-
Microfinance provides needed liquidity to households who don’t have sufficient
investible funds to exploit the opportunity.
-
On
the other hand, income can be also expanded thanks to savings activity because
microfinance includes both credit and savings.
-
Microfinance will increase the risk bearing of the household (Eswaran, M., and
A. Kotwal, 1990).
v
Reducing Vulnerability
As presented in
section 2.1.1.2, vulnerability is caused by sudden shocks such as natural
disasters, illness and something like that. The poor are easily affected by
these shocks and almost unable to cope with. In terms of economics, these shocks
are expressed by the unexpected increase in money outgoings excessive the money
inflow or net negative net cash flow (the difference between the money ingoings
and the money outflow) as simulated in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. Assuming that
at two periods, February to July and October to December, the net cash flow is
negative. Hence, a need for finance emerges. Given that the household can
modulate neither its ingoings (to increase it) nor its outgoings (to reduce it),
it will either use its savings or borrow to get through this period. If it has
no savings, microfinance will provide directly a regulatory mechanism.
Because
microfinance is used for solving the cash flow problem, borrowing credit at high
cost from the informal sector is avoidable, and therefore reduced, and
correspondingly, so is the level of emergency sale of productive assets at lower
price.
Vulnerability, or
cash flow problem can be indirectly lower by microfinance if it is used to
diversify income-generating activities, which can mitigate the outgoings.
v
Empowerment
Because of growing
gender inequality, it is argued that giving women access to credit is a means by
which both their economic and social position in household and in the community
would be enhanced (David Hulme and Paul Mosley, 1996). The argument bases on the
assumptions: that women will use loan for their own business, that they will be
successful in the business; that they will control over the profit from the
business; and finally that the greater participation in business will
consolidate the women’s economic and social status in the society.

2.1.2.2.3
Negative Impacts of Microfinance
When the interest
rate increases, the budget constraint rotates through the point E in a clockwise
direction from SL to PQ (that is the budget constraint line becomes steeper).
The new consumption is at point A', with C1 falling and C2
rising relative to the initial equilibrium. In the graph, then, we have a case
in which higher interest rates reduce current consumption and thus raise current
savings.
When the interest
rate goes up, there are two types of effects: substitution effect which
tends to increase savings and income effect which is inclined to lower
savings if the household was initially a net borrower.
Combining these
two effects, the current consumption is obviously lower than before the interest
increase. If the reduction in the future consumption due to the income effect is
higher than the increase in the future consumption due to the substitution
effect, the net effect of interest rate increase in the future consumption is
negative. In the opposite case, although the future consumption is higher than
before the increase in interest rate, this level is still lower than such level
at which the interest changes but the utility unchanges (point B). It means that
consumption levels of two periods due to the increase in interest rate are lower
than those with the same interest rate but the initial utility. Therefore, the
utility is lower than before interest rate increase. It means that borrower
becomes worse off due to the increase in interest rate, other things equal. The
indifference curve shifts downward from U1 to U2 as shown
in Figure 2.4, the household borrower gets lower utility.
Besides negative
effect on utility by this mechanism, credit induces the household to invest in
higher return but higher risk activities, their income is therefore more
vulnerable.
Getting
microfinance gives rise the household to leave out free-interest loans from
relatives or some source like that. It means that there is a loss which is equal
to the difference between microfinance cost and cost of borrowing from
free-interest rate loans.
Conclusion
Above are major
impacts of microfinance including positive and negative signs. Although
microfinance has a significant role on poverty reduction as proved before, it
doesn’t stand for a panacea for this “disease”. To reduce poverty, alternative
approaches are introduced as mentioned in the first section. Moreover, according
to Padmanabhan K.P (1988), it puts in effect only under following conditions:
·
The
poor are entrepreneur, i.e., they understand what credit is and are confident of
using it in their field conditions
·
An
improved technology which is clearly superior to traditional methods has been
developed.
·
The
associated support services and infrastructure facilities are present.
2.2
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.2.1
Alternative Approaches on Microfinance Impact Assessment
In doing
socio-economic impact assessment, there have been two major paradigms: the
quantitative approach and the qualitative approach. Each paradigm has
its own superiority and limitation. The importance is that the researcher has to
know how to combine them in an appropriate manner. The following part will
present the characteristics, advantages as well as disadvantages of each
paradigm, and the correction to its limitation.
2.2.1.1
Quantitative Method
Quantitative
method is defined as a method in attempt to ensure that effects can be
attributed to causes through experimentation, quasi-experimentation or
non-experimentation. This method compares the statistical results of the control
group with those of the treatment group to see the impact.
To show the real
impacts of microfinance, i.e., the contribution level or the role of
microfinance on poverty reduction, in quantitative method, researchers usually
use econometric models. Generally, the impact model has the following form:
Y =
SXij
+ ei
In which:
Yi is
the proxy of impacts such as consumption, income, education level, empowerment
and so on, which refer to the impacts on household i.
Xj is a
vector of household and comunity characteristics which affect Yi
such as loan size, length time of membership, family head’s education, family
head’s age, and so on, which refer to the individual, households and community
characteristics
ei
is the residual provided that the expected mean of
di
is equal zero or E(di)
= 0
Depending on
availability of data, time, statistics skills, financial status, the different
variables are introduced. Besides, in running regression, to avoid violence of
OLS assumptions, researchers have to use different correction methodologies.
2.2.1.2
Qualitative Method
Qualitative
approaches are also used in doing impact assessment with intention to provide an
interpretation of the process involved in intervention and of the impacts that
have a high level of plausibility rather trying to prove impact within
statistically definable limits of probability. The focus instead is on
understanding processes, behaviors, conditions perceived by interfered subjects
(Valadez and Bamberger, 1994). This method often pays attention to the ways in
which household perceives the microfinance programs and how they are affected by
it.
CHAPTER 3:
pROFILE OF THE SAVINGS AND CREDIT SCHEME OF SCF/uk IN CAM XUYEN, HA TINH
3.2
Profile of SCF/UK S&C programme in Cam Xuyen, Ha Tinh
Save the Children
Fund of United Kingdom (SC - UK) is one of the largest international
non-government organizations working for the best interest of children. Its
involvement in Ha Tinh Province took in the first place in 1989 as a part of
their “poverty alleviation” program through providing financial, technical and
training support in terms of “in kind” credit.
3.2.1 Objectives of the program
"To improve the
quality of life of poor women and their families through the initiation of a
sustainable credit and savings project in disadvantage communes" (SCF, 1996) has
been seen as the overall aim of the Savings and Credit Program which has been
launched firstly in Cam Long commune, Cam Xuyen district, Ha Tinh province since
1993. Specific objectives are:
·
Supplying small-scale productive loans to poor women for production activities
and income generation;
·
Mobilizing member savings for self-procured investment capital and to improve
families' economic securities;
·
Enhancing the management capacity and technical skills of implementers and
managers at all levels through training, study visits, technical assistance;
·
Expanding the credit and savings program to other villages and communes;
·
Besides providing credit and savings service, the Program has also provided
non-financial services such as education fund, training for women in credit
management to reach its goal and objectives;
3.2.2
Target of the program
SCF/UK S&C
programme targets the poor women with children 15 years old or younger.
3.2.3 Loan
conditions and procedures
To borrow from the
program, the applicant has to meet following requirements:
·
Resident in the target village;
·
Being women, regardless of membership in the women union;
·
Poor. Most communes based their definition on a minimum of three months of food
(rice) shortage combined with a maximum of 15 kilos of rice per head per month
(or its equivalent);
·
Willing to participate fully in the programme, including making repayments on
time and saving regularly;
·
Having experience in investment activities and/or being business- minded;
·
Women with children under 15 and women- headed households are given priority.
3.2.4
Lending and savings mechanism
As other NGOs,
microfinance provided by SC-UK has been done in terms of small, short-term,
productive and commercial repeated loans through joint-liability group of
above 5 or 6 members. On the other hand, savings also is included in
microfinance activity. The following will consider in detail the credit and
savings of this organization
-
Lending activity:
Ø
Joint-lending group:
SCF applies the group lending model of Grameen Bank in running savings and
credit scheme in Cam Xuyen district. The groups are formed voluntarily based on
trust and proximity of homes of group members. The group members are not
necessarily required to engage in the same productive activities. Group
mechanism provides a social guarantee instead of collateral, which the poor
normally do not have but usually is required by banking system when giving loans
and making repayment. If any of the group members does not repay or does not
repay on time, others within the group cannot get loans because it is provided
that in each group a maximum of only 3 people can be selected to receive the
initial loans. The remaining members have to wait for loans until repayments of
the previous borrowers have been made in full and on time. For that reason the
groups are called joint- liability groups.
Ø
Small, short-term, productive and commercial repeated loans:
The first loans are small because they suit needs and capacity of the poor. When
they have gained some investment experience and repaid the first loans, loans in
the next cycles will be expanded to a larger amount. The maximum loan size for
each borrower in the first cycle is 500,000 dong and for all subsequent cycles
are 1,000,000 dong.
Loan duration
depends on production cycles, therefore short- term and up to 12 months.
Repeated loans are
both an incentive for full and timely repayment and a way to help the poor to
gradually get out of poverty.
Productive
purposes ensure that the borrowers are able not only to repay the loans and
interest, but also to earn profits for further investment. No property
collateral is required from borrowers.
Before May 2001,
SCF borrowers were charged at the rate of 2% per month, of which 1% was
allocated for inflation fund; 0.5% for administration fund; 0.3% for risk fund
and 0.2% for education fund. Based upon the current inflation rate, savings
interest rate of commercial banks and other credit institutions and programs
cost in recent years, the Project has established a new lending interest rate of
1.5% per month.
Repayment of loans
and interest is made in monthly installments. A grace period is permitted for 1
month for all loans of up to 9 months and 2 months for loans of 10- 12 month
duration. Prior- to- maturity repayment is encouraged.
-
Savings service:
All members must
save regularly in their groups, beginning 3 months before any loan is disbursed
and continuing throughout their participation, regardless of whether they have a
loan. Minimum monthly amount of savings is between 4,000 and 5,000 dong.
Additional voluntary savings is encouraged. Savings cannot be withdrawn while
borrowers have outstanding loans. Three months after repayment of loans and
interest, savings can be withdrawn with one month in advance notice. The
interest on savings is added to the initial savings when withdrawal is made. No
interest is paid if savings is withdrawn prior to the agreed time. Before May
2001, savings earned an interest rate of 1.4% per month. At present, it is
reduced to 0.6% and this figure seems to be attractive to savers as it is higher
than the rate paid by the Bank and other credit and savings programs.
Savings mobilized
then can be relent to either members or non- members at interest rate of 2% per
month for the time before May 2001, and of 1.5% for now or deposited at a bank.
Loans from savings have the duration of up to 6 months with the maximum amount
of 300,000 dong. Loans can be used not only for productive purposes, but also
for consumption, often in the cases of emergencies, family events. Repayment of
loans from savings is made once at the end of the loan term.
3.2.6
Performance of the program in Cam Xuyen district
S&C activities
continue to expand and remain the core “pillar” of the programme. SCF/UK initial
strategy was to provide loans to 65- 70% of the villages within a commune. After
three years it will withdraw 50% of the loans from the old villages to transfer
to new villages. So far, three communes in Cam Xuyen District (Cam Long, Cam
Hoa, Cam Son) have rotated the loans to 100% of the villages in the communes.
Table 3.3:
SCF/UK scheme- General performance
|
Year of
operation |
1999 |
2001 |
|
Communes |
15 |
22 |
|
Villages |
83 |
149 |
|
Groups |
1,608 |
3,177 |
|
Borrowers |
9,330 |
16,801 |
|
SC/UK
initial loan fund |
4,427,300,000 |
7,465,000,000 |
|
Growth fund |
1,251,251,000 |
4,291,404,000 |
|
Savings fund
|
1,251,251,000 |
4,631,224,000 |
|
Total fund |
7,989,001,000 |
16,378,628,000 |
|
Average
loans/ person |
856,270.2 |
974,860 |
Source: SCF/UK
Report in 1999, 2000/ 2001.
Repayment rate of
the programme is perfect (99%- 100%). High repayment rate, accumulated inflation
fund and savings fund help not only to secure the loans fund but also to make
them greater. Management costs have been covered from interest payment.
By August 2001,
SCF/UK has granted a loans fund of 7,465 million dong to 22 communes among 27
communes of Cam Xuyen district for 16,801 borrowers of 3,177 groups. The total
amount of savings is dong 4,631.224 million dong. On average, each member has
saved 275,652 dong. The total amount of loans revolved is 2.2 times as much as
the initial loans fund from SCF/UK and 3.54 times as much as the total savings
accumulated by the members. Each borrower has received 3- 4 loans from the
programme. Some of its results in S&C activities are shown in Table 3.3.
CHAPTER 4: AN
ANALYSIS OF impact of scf’s MICROFINANCE ON POVERTY REDUCTIOn in cam xuyen, ha
tinh province
4.1 Overall approach of the study
In this chapter, the impact of SCF savings and credit on poverty reduction will
be explored based on the conceptual framwork in chapter 2 in order to answer
all research questions raised in section 1.3 will be answered. The analysis of
savings and credit's impact on poverty is based on my own data survey in 5
communes in Cam Xuyen district, Ha Tinh province in May, 2001. The evaluation
will be divided into three parts. Part 1 tries to see the outreach of the
program in terms of penetration ratio based upon the project data as well as
surveyed data. In this part, the author's desire is to answer the question:
"Whether the program fits the poor or not?” Part 2 will analyze the impact
of microfinance on three aspects including income change, vulnerability
reduction and empowerment based upon the conceptual and analytical framework in
chapter 2. To cope with the counterfactual problem, all three aspects are
compared between the members and non-members. Part 3 will make clearer the
impact of microfinance on income change by running regression.
4.2 An
Analysis of Impact of SCF’s Microfinance on Poverty Reduction in Cam Xuyen, Ha
Tinh Province
4.2.1 The
outreach of the program
The easiest realized characteristic of SCF is that 100% of its members are women
(data provided by SCF as well as shown in data survey) but the proportion of
poor women in the whole members hasn’t been clearly shown. In addition, neither
the reason why some poor women haven't joined the program nor what other sources
of credit such people resort to haven't been fully explained. Here these
problems will be answered in detail.
·
The proportion of poor and very poor borrowers access to SCF loan in the sample:
In the sample of 120 members, up to 65% of which are poor and very poor. To some
extent, the program has achieved its target on the poor. However, it also means
that the non-poor still have chance to access to SCF loan. The reason is that
the criteria for choosing member of SCF are based on number of months in
shortage of food and number of children in family as SCF wants to more focus on
children as its name. The threshold is that one household is in at least 3
months of food shortage and has at least three children under age of 15.
However, this benchmark is sometime flexible, one household may not meet the
threshold requirement of food shortage but has a lot of children (from 4 to
more), it is still able to access SCF loan.
The reasons why
some targeted people haven't joined the program:
Although the poor and very poor were targeted by the program, there exists some
disadvantaged who haven't joined SCF. The reason is that such households
have no productive activities to develop or do not feel confident about making
profitable use of their loan and being unable to repay. For them, microfinance
seems not to present a profitable opportunities to improve their living
conditions. In other words, microfinance is not really of major interest to the
very poor and poor.
·
Other sources of funding:
Beside SCF loans, loans from VBA, VBP, relatives and friends, and other sources
such as ROSCAs, private lenders seem very popular in the surveyed area. Up to 57
percent of members borrow from these sources, of which 40 percent are the poor
and very poor. It reflects that SCF loans haven't met the large demand for
capital and that is why they have to access to other sources of credit beside
SCF. Especially, loans from informal sources take up 78% of total loans other
than SCF loan, in which the poor and very poor borrowers take 81%. It implies
that informal financial providers still dominate lending to the disadvantaged.
4.2.2 The
impact of microfinance on poverty reduction
4.2.2 Income
increase
The survey shows
that up to 67% of interviewed members had higher income after 2 years whereas
this percentage falls to 56% for non-members. Especially, nearly a quarter of
such 67% have much higher income than before.
Table 4.1: The
income change of the members and non-members
|
Members |
Non-members |
|
|
Frequency |
Percent |
Cumulative Percent |
|
Frequency |
Percent |
Cumulative Percent |
|
Unchanged or lower |
40 |
33.3 |
33.3 |
Unchanged or lower |
58 |
44.6 |
44.6 |
|
A little higher |
64 |
53.4 |
86.7 |
A little higher |
52 |
40 |
84.6 |
|
Much higher |
16 |
13.3 |
100 |
Much higher |
20 |
15.4 |
100 |
|
Total |
120 |
100 |
|
Total |
130 |
100 |
|
Source: Data
survey
For SCF surveyed
members, 70% of them used loan for investment, of which investing in new
income-generating activities accounts for 34%, i.e. 23.8% of the whole surveyed
members (Table 4.1). Taking SCF loans for consumption and debt payment make up
23% and 7% of total members, respectively. For those who used SCF loans for
investment, up to 85% of them had higher income while 89% of those using loans
for debt payment couldn’t increase their income. Surprisingly, nearly 70% of
those spending their SCF loan for consumption got improved income. The reason is
that credit used for consumption such as food, health and clothing can create
income through improved productivity of labor.
Beside the use of
the loan, income change can be influenced by the wealth level of the borrowers.
Breaking the members with different levels of wealth and the level of income
change, the income change on the very poor seems ambiguous. Fifty three percent
of the very poor and poor borrowers have income unchanged or lower than before
taking the loans while nearly 46% have income a litter higher and only 1% has
income much higher. For the average and other better-off borrower categories,
the income change appears clearer. All of them have income higher than 2 years
ago, especially, 12% of such categories obtain much higher income.
Table 4.2: Spreading the members and non-members by wealth categories and
income change (%)
|
Income change level |
Members |
Non-members |
|
Level of wealth |
Level of wealth |
|
Very poor and poor |
Average and higher better-off categories |
Very poor and poor |
Average and higher better-off categories |
|
Lower |
30 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
|
Unchanged |
23 |
0 |
52 |
25 |
|
A little higher |
46 |
88 |
23 |
67 |
|
Much higher |
1 |
12 |
0 |
8 |
|
Total |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
Source: Data survey |
By the same
treatment with the non-borrowers, the findings are that only 23% of the poor and
very poor non-borrowers have income a litter higher, the rest has income
unchanged and lower.
In general, members become better off than non-borrowers do. For members whose
income increases after taking SCF credit, the main reason in the member's
perception, which is to have access to SCF credit accounts for 79%. Other
reasons such as children growing up or taking aid from relatives also affected
to the increase in income.
Table 4.3: The
most important cause for the increase in income by wealth categories (%)
|
|
Very poor |
Poor |
Average |
Wealthy |
Very wealthy |
|
Involvement
in SCF |
15 |
36 |
55 |
| |