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The LRMC will be calculated for each rating period (h1, h2 and h3 for peak, intermediate and base load, respectively). A load duration curve (Appendix 5) is established from historical data of the system operation. Assume a sustained increase of 1 kW in peak, or intermediate, or base load demand, the marginal costs for each rating period are calculated respectively as follows: q Long-run average incremental cost: This is the per kWh cost of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity for the planning period (say T years), all discounted at a specific discount rate i: where Mt and Ct are annual maintenance and capacity costs and Et is the amount of energy delivered in year T. Another economic solution for energy is a two-part tariff, which has both a fixed component (a standing charge) recovering system capital costs and a variable component (a metered running rate) to recover variables costs. The former will be formed basing on capacity LRMC and the latter basing on energy LRMC. In practice, the total LRMC that will form retail tariff includes LRMC of transmission and distribution (T&D), which may also be divided into capacity and energy LRMC. q Transmission and Distribution capacity cost: The usual approach to estimating marginal T&D cost is the LRAIC method. q Transmission and distribution energy cost: Since T&D system do not have a direct energy cost (all incurs in generating stage), in the marginal cost analysis, T&D energy cost refers to the added cost of energy due to losses in the T&D system. CONCLUSION The common applied method is the long run average incremental marginal cost (LRAIC), which neglected the least cost principle. Though the appearance of the formulas is simple, its application into practice is very complicated. For a small company or agency at provincial level, to hire a consultant company is not economical, and could be a waste of time and money. As well, such a big and complicated analysis may be beyond small company or agency’s capability. On the other hand, the company, which is about to takeover a rural network, as well as the governmental authority need to know what is a suitable retail tariff for that region. The reason of the need for a good applicable tariff calculation includes also an optimal decision and cost recovery. An easier method for electricity calculation therefore will be presented in Chapter 4 of the thesis, which fundamentally simplifies the basic theory given above, for an easy application.
Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) is a state-owned corporation under the Ministry of Industry (MOI). Electricity tariffs are also subject to government control therefore it is a rather complex process for EVN to raise it up to LRMC level. Though EVN’s organization chart looks hierarchical, such a large institutional apparatus makes managerial procedures more complicated and time-consuming.
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|
500 – 700
(VND/kWh) |
700 – 900 (VND/kWh) |
> 900 (VND/kWh) |
Total |
||||
|
|
Quan. |
% |
Quan. |
% |
Quan. |
% |
Elec. Com. |
|
Hanoi PC |
92 |
81.4 |
20 |
17.7 |
1 |
0.9 |
113 |
|
HCM PC |
61 |
100.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
0 |
0.0 |
61 |
|
Haiphong PC |
164 |
95.9 |
7 |
4.1 |
0 |
0.0 |
171 |
|
Dongnai PC |
120 |
90.2 |
0 |
0.0 |
13 |
9.8 |
133 |
|
PC 1 |
2,075 |
52.9 |
1,412 |
36.0 |
436 |
11.1 |
3,905 |
|
PC2 |
1,108 |
67.2 |
388 |
23.5 |
152 |
9.2 |
1,642 |
|
PC3 |
593 |
53.0 |
471 |
42.1 |
55 |
4.9 |
1,119 |
Source: EVN – Department of
Electricity Development of Rural and Mountainous Areas
The principle of setting electricity tariffs is that the user must incur as much as they caused for the system. However, it seems unfair if the rich (PC Hanoi, Hai Phong, Dong Nai and Ho Chi Minh i.e. the urban population) pays at lower levels in comparioson with the poor (PC1,2 and 3 i.e. the rural population). According to the regulated progressive tariff scheme applied to the urban household, the first 100 kWh costs them only 500 VND/kWh. Meanwhile, the rural resident has to pay at least 500-700 ND/kWh for the same electricity consume. (The average electricity consumption of a rural household is only about 30-45 kWh per month).
The electricity tariff system in Vietnam consists of two kinds of tariff: bulk supply tariff (BST) and retail tariff.
The procedure for setting the Bulk Supply Tariff is as follows:
Step 1: Calculation of Total Forecast Profit of the Power Sector.
Step 2: Allocation of the net profit to the PCs
Step 3: Calculation of the Ability to Pay for each PC
Step 4: Calculation of Bulk Power Price (VND/kWh) for each PC.
Bulk Power Price=Ability to Pay/Total bulk power (kWh) purchased from EVN
The procedure has been designed to take into account the ability to pay of each PC, but in fact, there are some problems in this formula:
§ It does not reflect the costs of generation and transmission to the individual PCs.
§ It encourages increases in the number of staff and the associated costs in each PC.
§ It undermines the ability of EVN and the PCs to operate as independent and financially self - sufficient entities capable of attracting the large amounts of capital needed for system upgrades and expansion.
This tariff is quite low and applied to urban residential, industrial, agricultural and commercial consumers.... no rural residential.
This type of retail tariff, which is avaiable in rural areas, vary in large range depending on the expected margins of wholesalers thus it is quite high. The highest retail tariff recorded has reached the level of over 3000 VND/kWh.
Cross subsidization exists in the current tariff scheme causing negative effects as follows:
§ It works against consumers making least-cost choices, undermines investor‘s efforts to provide alternative energy forms.
§ It provides the widespread recourse to unnecessary subsidies frequently proves to be fiscally unsustainable. When coupled with price restrictions, subsidies eventually limit utilities’ investment programs.
§ Subsidies discourage efficient energy use.
Therefore, a
regionally discriminated tariff scheme will not only increase overall welfare
but also help to avoid counterproductive effects.
CONCLUSION
A sound tariff scheme takes an important role in improving and expanding rural electrification process because it encourages local supplier to joint the business by expanding rural network to rural household and attracts rural users to the modern energy as well.
If EVN has to take over the entire network, it will become a huge burden not only on the organizational structure but also on financial sustainability of EVN. Meanwhile the curren retail tariff in rural areas must be reduced to assure social equality. Cross-subsidization has been seen as a short – term support rather than a long – term strategy while rural electrification is now seen quite an urgent need for fueling rural development in the perspective of trying to catch-up the neighboring countries.
q Equality: Suppose that the retail tariff will be increased to cover real LRMC, the rural population will be further suffered.
q Willingness to pay and affordability: An increase in tariff level may exclude the rural poor from using this modern energy.
q Competitiveness: An increase in electricity tariffs could damage the competitiveness position of Vietnamese industry.
q Budget saving: National budget will eventually be suffered if EVN suffers losses because EVN is a state-owned enterprise.
q Financial viability: An increase in the retail tariff for low-rate-of-return rural electrification projects will undoubtedly ease the financial burden for EVN providing that it either takes control over the major rural distribution networks or increase its BST accordingly.
|
|
Level 1 |
Level 2 |
Level 3 |
|
Willingness to pay (VND/month) |
25,000 |
50,000 |
75,000 |
|
Accepted household (%) |
50 % |
30 % |
15 % |
|
Ave. elec. Consumption (kWh/month) |
15 – 45 kWh |
||
|
Willingness
to pay (VND/kWh) |
800 – 1666 VND |
||
Source: Author’s summary.
EVN/World Bank (1998) Report No. 2
One important conclusion from the above table is that the present tariff does not seem to present an ability-to-pay problem for the average rural households, despite the fact that the average tariff (approximately 5-6 USc/kWh or equivalent to 700-840VND/kWh) is quite high compared to other developing countries. Therefore, a reasonable increase in regulated retail tariff is feasible.
- The LRMC estimated in 1993 was about US 7.0 cents/kWh.
- The ADB’s Tariff Study calculated the total LRMC of 8.9 cents/kWh.
- The World Bank estimated the retail level LRMC of US 8.1 cents/kWh.
- The Rural Electrification Master Plan Study worked out the average LRMC of 11.9 USc/kWh for the whole system including investment on rural electrification programs up to the year 2005.
- This simplified
model of LRMC calculation will be applied for different regions, reducing
negative effects of cross-subsidization.
- This simple calculation can be easily utilized by any institution or even individual who may concern.
- The consumers may find it more acceptable to pay high tariffs if they know how tariffs are calculated than if they are just presented as a fact.
1- The “least cost” combination of the power plants is achieved and the system is not substantially sub-optimal.
2- There is no residual value of the equipment or other fixed assets. In other words, after the period of useful life span, the equipment is assumed to entirely wear-out.
3- The inflation rate will not change through the whole planning period.
The advantage of this methodology is that it can be applied for a consumer group of any size, from a single consumption unit to a commune or the whole country.
Electricity cost is distinguished into: running costs, generating capacity costs, transmission capacity costs, distribution capacity costs and others
q Region of practice: The chosen area is specified as profile No 7 in the survey of the World Bank on Rural Electrification Master Plan Study in cooperation with EVN – Demand forecast issues.
|
Unit |
Quantity/Description |
|
|
Income per household per year |
Million VND |
7 |
|
Population density |
Capita/km2 |
38 |
|
Average population per commune |
Capita |
7000 |
|
Terrain |
|
Hilly-mountainous |
|
Region classification |
|
NM, NCC,SCC,CH |
|
Electricity consumption |
KWh/-HH/year |
180-560 |
|
Connection rate 1998-2010 |
% |
30-75 |
|
Connection rate 2010-2020 |
% |
90 |
Note: HH means “household”
Source: EVN/ World Bank (1998) – Report No 2 – Table 5.1 page 16 & Table 5.2 page 20
q Data: The data will also be taken from the same survey carried out by World Bank.
q Outcome: Data will be categorized and applied into the model. The following are the results:
|
|
System load
rating periods |
||
|
|
Peak |
Intermediate |
Base |
|
1. Marginal plant (typical) |
Gas turbine |
Coal thermal |
Hydro |
|
6. Adjusted running cost (USD/kWh) |
0.032 |
0.025 |
0.00 |
|
13.
Adjusted generating capacity cost (USD/kWh) |
0.090 |
|
|
|
21.
Adjusted transmission capacity cost (USD/kWh) |
0.034 |
0.047 |
0.024 |
|
27.
Adjusted distribution capacity cost (USD/kWh) |
0.027 |
0.038 |
0.020 |
|
28.
Electricity LRMC (USD/kWh) |
0.183 |
0.110 |
0.044 |
The calculated
average electricity LRMC in this rural commune is 9 USc/kWh (equivalent to
about 1260 VND/kWh
q Policy
implication
Ø The table of results tells us that the large portion of total LRMC is categorized under generation and transmission costs rather than distribution costs. It implies that the PCs (or EVN) will be suffered most since the BST for rural are at low level ranging from 360 VND/kWh to 759 VND/kWh.
Ø Suppose a full rise in the retail tariff up to the LRMC of 9 USc/kWh (i.e. 1260 VND/kWH), the total payment per year that each household will have to make for their electricity utilization ranges from VND 226,800 to VND 705,600 accounting for 3,3% to 10% of the yearly income. It implies that increasing regulated retail tariff level is acceptable, even up to its LRMC.
Ø Suppose three scenarios of partly raising retail tariff up to 6, 7 or 8 USc/kWh, consequently. Given the current regulated retail tariff of 700 VND/kWh.
|
|
UNIT |
SCENARIO
1 |
SCENARIO
2 |
SCENARIO
3 |
|
Retail tariff |
USD/kWh |
0.06 |
0.07 |
0.08 |
|
VND equivalent |
VND/kWh |
840 |
980 |
1120 |
|
Loss per kWh |
USD |
0.03 |
0.02 |
0.01 |
|
Loss per household |
USD |
10.8 |
7.2 |
3.6 |
|
Number of HHs in the sample commune |
|
1000 |
1000 |
1000 |
|
Loss per commune |
USD |
|
|
|
|
- (1)
Connection rate of 30% |
|
3,240 |
2,160 |
1,080 |
|
- (1) Connection
rate of 70% |
|
7,560 |
5,040 |
2,520 |
|
Number of electrified commune |
|
7,100 |
7,100 |
7,100 |
|
Rough estimated compensation |
Mill. USD |
|
|
|
|
- Connection rate of
30% |
|
23.004 |
15.336 |
7.668 |
|
- Connection rate of
70% |
|
53.676 |
35.784 |
17.892 |
Note: (1) Refer to Table 3: Description
of sample region - Profile 7
The best solution is a full support of the governmental budget in the early stage of rural electrification program to encourage the growth of connection rate in rural areas. The retail tariff then will be increases gradually over time up to a certain level within the constraint of ability to pay.
Ø In addition, the model with clear formulas gives some suggestions for the way to reduce LRMC by making change on technical parameters such as losses:
Changes in distribution loss
|
Reduce of distribution loss (%) |
- 7 |
- 5 |
1 |
3 |
|
Calculated LRMC |
9.6 |
9.4 |
8.95 |
8.8 |
A reduction by 3% in distribution loss will result in corresponding fall in LRMC from 9 USc/kWh to 8.8 USc/kWh.
The rural
electrification process in Vietnam is facing conflicting benefits of different
involving subjects. The government wants EVN to take over rural network and
keep retail tariff under control at rather low level. EVN is now too cumbersome
to have more institutions covering all rural areas. Moreover, additional
investment on non-profit rural electrification projects will further push its
financial position come from bad to worse.
It wants to increase regulated tariff level, including in rural regions,
to ease the burden. The rural households in their turn want to have better
management of the rural network lower retail tariff.
A
methodology of calculating LRMC therefore was presented in chapter 4 as a basis
for further study on detail rural tariff – setting policy. The whole process of
the calculation, step by step, and the outcome has recommended some valuable
ideas, which even go to the opposite direction to what was expected. Instead of
reducing the free-setting retail tariffs, which are claimed to be high, to low
regulated level, the result suggested that the tariffs for the rural population
should also be raised gradually to the corresponding LRMC level along with
tariffs for other consumer groups. Reasonable increases over time will not
exclude rural residential out of accessibility to this modern energy but
strengthen financial capability of ENV and the government in case of a rural
electrification project. That means those projects will be more viable,
speeding up the electrification process. On the other hand, the tariff adjustment
will of course eliminate partly disadvantages of cross-subsidization available
in the electricity sector.
The
different retail tariffs basing on the presented LRMC calculation methodology
are applicable in various regions all over the country for the two reasons. First, this
tariff system does actually exist in electrified communes. The problems of the
current spontaneous system are that (i) the customers do not know whether they
are charged at reasonable price; and (ii) the high tariff actually benefit the
local electricity authority rather than encourage or aim at future rural
network expansion or improvement. Therefore, it should be modified for the sake
of the economic development in rural regions as well as in the whole economy. Second, many management
models down to the commune level are available with all the advantages and
disadvantages for comparison. It is also a convenient basis for realizing
tariff system of various levels.
Nevertheless,
detail of a tariff-setting mechanism has not been discussed in the study.
Policy recommendations target to the retail and bulk supply tariffs on average.
For example, a lifeline
tariff[3] is useful
for low-income households. This encourages low-income household to use
electricity. However, the lifeline tariff should be restricted to very low
consumption levels to prevent the utility or local electricity agency being
overburdened. The current residential tariff block is suggested to be refined
by reducing the upper limit of the first tier to 30kWh per month instead of the
current 100kWh per month. This will prevent unnecessary subsidization to a too
large part of people while the adjusted upper limit is proved to be enough for
the basic needs. Therefore, a further study on the establishment of the tariff
system basing on this LRMC calculation is expected to be carried out for a
comprehensive and effective pricing policy. The tariff system should enable a
transparent and practical mechanism of
revising tariff level over time according to changes in relating economic
indicators such as inflation rate.
As the
increasing gaps between rural and urban areas are certain to slow down the
economic growth and to hamper a sustainable development. Therefore, the need of
expanding and improving rural electrification has ranked among top priorities.
In order to speed up the progress, a
number of policies should go in line with pricing policy as follows:
q
It would be more rational to prioritize full electrification
including upgrading of the existing and often deficient LV rural networks,
before pushing ahead with an electrification which may not reach many consumers
anyway. Therefore, priorities should be defined clearly for each regions or
communes. The capital in this case will be used intensively and efficiently for
the improvement of the electrified communes rather than for expanding the
national grid to remote areas. Instead,
IPPs using renewable energy will be planned to be developed in those
areas.
q
There should be an isolated fund for governmental investment
on RE with separate financial management so as to reduce financial burden on
EVN.
q
Decentralization, especially at low managerial levels such
as communes, is necessary to prevent disadvantages of a full monopoly in the
sector. In addition, it also lessens the complication in managerial structure
of EVN. However, the involvement of
private parties will work providing that:
Ø
Legislation to allow the generation and sale of electricity
by private parties is established officially.
Ø
Standard level of service (which may be less than full
availability in some cases) is clearly defined.
Ø
Standard contract conditions and warranty requirements are
clearly defined
Ø
Technical and managerial training will be provided by the
engineers of EVN and PCs.
[1] EVN has an estimation of equal amount of VND 36,800 billion for the same target. The World Bank’s one is chosen in this case due to consistence of the thesis.
[2] Use the current exchange rate of 14,000 VND/USD
[3] The lifeline tariff is the lowest tariff level in the tariff scale for residential consumers. The lifeline tariff is to be set especially for the poor so it is imposed on a certain small amount of the first kWh consumed, e.g. 30 – 100 kWh, depending on realistic living standard and demand of the poor in the country.
