| Sunday, September 5, 2010 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Source: Author’s
estimates from VLSSs The gap between rural and urban areas is reaffirmed in Figure 1. For each percentage of population in each area, per capita expenditure and per capita income are consistently higher in urban areas than rural areas.
However, for formal treatment of rural-urban gap, it is necessary to calculate some inequality indices such as Gini, Theil or Log Variance index. · Inequality measurementIn the thesis, I use Theil index because it is decomposable and can provide inequality not only within but also between rural and urban areas.
Source: Author’s
estimates from VLSSs For the within-group component, within-rural inequality was lower than within-urban inequality. If combined (both within-rural and within-urban), the within-group component played a big share in total inequality, 88.83% for 1992-93 and 83.18% for 1997-98. However, the within-group component remained rather stable over the period from 1992-93 to 1997-98 (a slight change of 2.31% for within-rural inequality and –0.62% for within-urban inequality). In contrast, comprising a small share in total inequality (11.17% in 1992-93 and 16.82% in 1997-98), the between-group component recorded a dramatic increase of 61.96%. It meant that the dynamic inequality in Vietnam, over the past years, was mainly explained by the between-group component. So, what are the policy implications deriving from state of inequality in Vietnam? Ø Firstly, because the within-rural inequality was lower than the within-urban inequality. Therefore, in Vietnam, economic growth targeting rural areas creates more equal distribution (and will thus generate more welfare) than that targeting urban areas. Ø Secondly, because the dynamic inequality is mostly explained by the widening gap between rural and urban areas, efforts to prevent inequality from rising must be concentrated on narrowing down rural-urban gap. · Poverty measurementFor some economists (Basic Need model,
Maoist idea) the state of the poor is the most important indicator for whatever
analysis. In their opinions, rural-urban gap is best reflected by comparing the
state of the poor within each group.
Source: Author’s estimates from VLSSs Table 3 presents the results of FGT index (see Ravallion 1994 for further information of this index). Thre is a clear conclusion: poverty in Vietnam unambiguously decreased from 1992-93 to 1997-98. However, poverty reduction was not equally distributed. In urban areas, the “incidence of poverty” dramatically fell from 25.1% to 9.2% (a decrease of 63%), while that number in rural areas did not drop as much, just from 66.4% to 45.5% (a decrease of only 31%). The similar situation was observed in “poverty depth” and “poverty severity”. Beside the FGT index, vulnerability to economic shock is also extensively used in the poverty analysis. Figure 2 shows the vulnerability for both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, a lot of people just pass the poverty line somewhat, a small shock can submerge a large number of rural people into poverty. 1789.71 1789.71 Poverty
line Poverty line Rural areas Urban areas Source: Author’s
estimates from VLSSs
Ø From all of these analyses on poverty, we arrive at a clear policy implication: poverty is largely a rural phenomenon, so that any poverty alleviation effort must be concentrated in rural areas.
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|
|
|
Urban-Rural ratio |
Change |
|
|
|
|
1992-93 |
1997-98 |
|
|
Region |
|
|
|
|
|
|
South East |
1.74 |
1.81 |
4.24% |
|
|
Red River Delta |
2.35 |
2.17 |
-7.93% |
|
|
Central Coast |
1.63 |
1.7 |
4.51% |
|
|
Mekong River Delta |
1.6 |
1.86 |
16.12% |
|
|
North Central Coast |
1.42 |
1.84 |
29.98% |
|
|
Northern Upland |
1.52 |
1.84 |
20.58% |
|
Economic sector |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agriculture |
1.47 |
1.53 |
4.46% |
|
|
Electricity & water production, distribution |
2.02 |
2.33 |
15.29% |
|
|
Mining & extracting minerals |
1.65 |
2.02 |
22.42% |
|
|
Industry |
1.61 |
2.08 |
28.70% |
|
|
Transport & communication |
1.34 |
1.43 |
6.10% |
|
|
Other service categories |
1.57 |
1.87 |
19.42% |
|
|
Commerce |
1.61 |
1.72 |
6.70% |
|
|
Finance |
1.42 |
1.53 |
7.70% |
|
Ethnicity |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other minorities |
1.92 |
1.87 |
-2.63% |
|
|
Vietnamese |
1.69 |
2.05 |
21.19% |
|
|
Chinese |
1.48 |
2.41 |
62.95% |
|
Profession |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Agricultural, forestry & fishery |
1.41 |
1.51 |
7.09% |
|
|
Unskilled workers |
1.55 |
1.92 |
23.95% |
|
|
Skilled manual workers |
1.46 |
2.01 |
37.70% |
|
|
Assemblers & machine operators |
1.32 |
1.54 |
16.66% |
|
|
Service & sales |
1.6 |
1.72 |
7.70% |
|
|
Leaders & professionals |
1.67 |
2.35 |
40.71% |
|
Education |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Non-education |
1.73 |
2.17 |
25.09% |
|
|
Primary |
1.76 |
1.86 |
5.85% |
|
|
Lower-secondary |
1.93 |
1.94 |
0.29% |
|
|
Upper-secondary |
1.85 |
2.07 |
12.14% |
|
|
University or higher |
2.1 |
2.25 |
6.90% |
Whatever fields we use to measure rural-urban gap, there was always significant gap between the two areas. Urban people were significantly better off than rural people across regions, across economic activities, across ethnic groups, and across educational levels. Also, the gap has significantly widened from 1992-93 to 1997-98.
The first two parts in this section has presented an obvious rural-urban gap in general picture as well as in various fields. However, it is a static picture, which cannot suggest anything about the future trend of the rural-urban gap. An analysis of income structure can provide some insights to this trend.
In income structure analysis, total household income is divided
into two categories: earned income including
wage, agriculture, self-employment
|
|
Rural |
Urban |
||
|
|
Percent receiving |
Income |
Percent |
Income share |
|
Earned income |
|
|
|
|
|
Wage |
49.2% |
16.9% |
69.0% |
32.2% |
|
Agriculture |
94.4% |
44.0% |
23.3% |
3.5% |
|
Self-employment |
40.9% |
21.6% |
66.7% |
41.1% |
|
Unearned income |
|
|
|
|
|
Pensions |
19.3% |
3.9% |
26.3% |
4.3% |
|
Remittances |
17.8% |
4.6% |
35.3% |
10.7% |
|
Others |
91.4% |
9.1% |
83.8% |
8.3% |
|
Total |
|
100.0% |
|
100.0% |
Source: Author’s estimates from VLSSs
From this Table, it is clear that income sources varied significantly between the two areas in 1997-98. Looking at “percent receiving” item, in urban areas, 69% of households had at least one member working for wages, and 66.7% received income from self-employment. However, only 49.2% of rural households received wage income and 40.9% received self-employment income. The difference was more marked in the agricultural income. While nearly all rural households (94.4%) received income from agriculture, only a small number of urban households did (23.3%).
Looking at the “income share” item, in urban areas, both wage and self-employment accounted for as much as 32.2% and 41.1% of total household income. In contrast, in rural areas, these numbers were reduced by half at 16.9% and 21.6%. The contrast between the two areas was more marked in agriculture, where 44% of household income derived from this source in rural areas, but only 3.5% did in urban areas. It is important to note that 23.3% of household income in urban areas derived from unearned income, while only 17.6% of rural income came from this source. In overall, while urban households well diversified their income sources into wage, self-employment and unearned income, rural households were very vulnerable to risk because income from agriculture - one activity with very unstable operation- accounted for as much as 44% of the total income portfolio.
Income from agriculture is the most important source in rural areas. However, its decline is inevitable. In the reports from UNDP (1999) and WB (1999), they noted that most of the income increase in agriculture, over the past years, mainly derived from the new opportunities created by the reform package in 1988-1993 such as land and ownership reform (through de-collectivization) and agriculture diversification. At present, not many opportunities from reform are left for exploitation, so the pace of agricultural growth in future will be much lower than its pace during 1993-98. Hence, a relative decline of income from agriculture compared with other sources of income is unavoidable. Naturally, rural people will suffer most from agricultural decline.
The previous chapter provides a picture of the rural-urban gap in Vietnam. As mentioned in the “theoretical review” there are many factors simultaneously causing this gap. This chapter will quantify the role of each factor.
|
|
A |
B |
C |
||||
|
|
Average value |
Return (or coefficient) |
Return gap |
Characteristics
gap |
|||
|
|
Rural |
Urban |
Rural b |
Gap b1 |
Urban b+b1 |
b1 |
|
|
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
(7) |
|
Education |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Primary |
0.38 |
0.27 |
0.1127
(12%) |
0 |
0.1127
(12%) |
0 |
-0.0122 |
|
Lower-secondary |
0.40 |
0.34 |
0.1922
(21%) |
0 |
0.1922
(21%) |
0 |
-0.0113 |
|
Upper-secondary |
0.12 |
0.25 |
0.3138
(37%) |
0.0818 |
0.3956
(49%) |
0.0201 |
0.0381 |
|
University or higher |
0.01 |
0.09 |
0.5492
(73%) |
0 |
0.5492
(73%) |
0 |
0.0401 |
|
(No-education) |
0.09 |
0.06 |
|
0 |
|
0 |
|
|
sum up |
S=1.00 |
S=1.00 |
|
|
|
S=0.0201 |
S=0.0547 |
|
Occupation |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
White-collar workers |
0.04 |
0.14 |
0.3036 (35%) |
0.1547 |
0.4583
(58%) |
0.0211 |
0.0281 |
|
Blue-collar workers |
0.09 |
0.16 |
0.1103
(12%) |
0.2114 |
0.3247
(38%) |
0.0347 |
0.0082 |
|
Saler and service |
0.11 |
0.33 |
0.1073
(11%) |
0.1881 |
0.2954
(35%) |
0.0621 |
0.0240 |
|
Non-working |
0.13 |
0.25 |
0.062 (6%) |
0.2285 |
0.2905
(34%) |
0.0571 |
0.0077 |
|
(Agriculture) |
0.63 |
0.12 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
sum up |
S=1.00 |
S=1.00 |
|
|
|
S=0.1750 |
S=0.0681 |
|
Demographics |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Age of the head |
4.17 |
4.45 |
0.0307 (3%) |
-0.036 |
-0.0053
(-1%) |
-0.1601 |
0.0086 |
|
Sex of the head |
0.83 |
0.62 |
-0.0668
(-6%) |
0 |
-0.0668
(-6%) |
0 |
0.0138 |
|
(Male=1, Female=0) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number of baby |
0.73 |
0.54 |
-0.0973
(-9%) |
0 |
-0.0973
(-9%) |
0 |
0.0188 |
|
Number of adult |
3.06 |
3.54 |
0.0561 (6%) |
0.039 |
0.0951 (10%) |
0.1379 |
0.0265 |
|
Marriage status |
0.88 |
0.82 |
0.0689 (7%) |
0 |
0.0689 (7%) |
0 |
-0.0041 |
|
(Couple=1, Single=0) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number of children |
5.54 |
5.29 |
-0.0667 (-6%) |
-0.0345 |
-0.1012
(-10%) |
-0.1824 |
0.0172 |
|
sum up |
|
|
|
|
|
S=-0.2045 |
S=0.0807 |
|
Ethnicity |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Vietnamese |
0.82 |
0.91 |
0.2853
(33%) |
0 |
0.2853
(33%) |
0 |
0.0265 |
|
Chinese |
0.00 |
0.08 |
0.5389
(71%) |
0 |
0.5389
(71%) |
0 |
0.0390 |
|
(Other minorities) |
0.18 |
0.01 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
sum up |
S=1.00 |
S=1.00 |
|
|
|
S=0.0000 |
S=0.0656 |
|
Intercept |
|
|
a=7.265 |
a1=0.467 |
a+a1=7.732 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
S=-0.0094 |
S=0.2691 |

The results of “return gap” and “characteristics gap” are
presented in column C of Table 6. In which, column C6 is “return gap” b1
This section consists of two parts. The first part is the static decomposition, which will decompose 1997-98 rural-urban gap. The second part is the dynamic decomposition, which will decompose the change in the gap from 1992-93 to 1997-98.
Table 7: Decomposition of rural-urban gap
|
|
Gap value |
Percent in rural-urban gap |
|||||||
|
Characteristics
gap |
|
|
|
|||||||
|
Ethnicity |
0.0656 |
9.03% |
|
|||||||
|
Education |
0.0547 |
7.53% |
|
|||||||
|
Occupation |
0.0681 |
9.37% |
|
|||||||
|
Demographics |
0.0807 |
11.11% |
|
|||||||
|
|
S=0.2691 |
S=37.03% |
|
|||||||
|
Return
gap |
|
|
|||||||
|
Ethnicity |
0.0000 |
0.00% |
|||||||
|
Education |
0.0201 |
2.76% |
|||||||
|
Occupation |
0.1750 |
24.09% |
|||||||
|
Demographics |
-0.2045 |
-28.14% |
|||||||
|
|
S=-0.0094 |
S=-1.29% |
|||||||
|
Environment
gap |
0.4670 |
64.26% |
|
||||||
|
Rural-urban gap |
S=0.7267 |
S=100% |
|||||||
Return gap: Aggregate return gap actually reduced rural-urban gap by 1.29%. The return gap was mostly observed in the categories of occupation and demographics. While occupation worked in widening the gap (24.09%), demographics worked in reducing the gap (-28.14%).
Ø The results from decomposition make clear about the fallacy in the normal thinking of some people when they claimed that higher urban living standard was “fair” (Long, Trung 1995). Their justification has rested on arguments that urban people are endowed with many favorable characteristics, such as high level of education, working in high-productivity occupation, more adult and less children. Argument of this type merely reflected a third of the rural-urban gap (37.03%), the rest as much as 62.97% is explained by discrimination.
In this part, I try to demonstrate that discrimination is not only the main factor in explaining rural-urban gap in 1997-98 but also the main factor in explaining the increase in the rural-urban gap from 1992-93 to 1997-98.
Based on the static decomposition in 1992-93 and 1997-98, Equation-6 (page 7) is computed.
Gt+1 – Gt = ( Et+1 – Et ) + ( Rt+1 – Rt ) + ( Ct+1 – Ct ) (6)
The results from this equation are presented in Table 8. In which, the percentage numbers in the last column tell the share of each factor in the gap’s increase from 1992-93 to 1997-98.
|
|
1992-1993 (1) |
1997-1998 (2) |
Increase (2) – (1) |
Percentage in the gap’s increase |
|
Characteristics gap |
|
|
|
|
|
Ethnicity |
0.068 |
0.0656 |
-0.0024 |
-1% |
|
Education |
0.0291 |
0.0547 |
0.0256 |
18% |
|
Occupation |
0.0608 |
0.0681 |
0.0073 |
5% |
|
Demographics |
0.0778 |
0.0807 |
0.0029 |
2% |
|
|
S=0.2356 |
S=0.2691 |
S=0.0335 |
S=24% |
|
Return gap |
|
|
|
|
|
Ethnicity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0% |
|
Education |
0.0297 |
0.0201 |
-0.0096 |
-7% |
|
Occupation |
0.0411 |
0.175 |
0.1339 |
96% |
|
Demographics |
-0.1808 |
-0.2045 |
-0.0237 |
-17% |
|
|
S=-0.1099 |
S=-0.0094 |
S=0.1005 |
S=72% |
|
Environment gap |
0.4611 |
0.467 |
0.0059 |
4% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rural-urban gap |
S=0.5868 |
S=0.7267 |
S=0.1399 |
S=100% |
Source: (1) is
from 1992-93 decomposition
(2) is from 1997-98 decomposition
Table 8 shows that the gap’s increase was explained by three factors: the increase in the characteristics gap, the increase in the return gap, and the increase in the environment gap:
Characteristics gap: Excluding “ethnicity” (-1%), all categories in this factor made a positive contribution to the increase in gap, while “education” recorded the biggest increase of all (18%). Overall, the increase in the characteristics gap contributed 24% to the gap’s increase.
Return gap: With a contribution of 72%, increase in the return gap was the dominant factor in explaining the gap’s increase. However, the role of each category in this factor was quite different. Particularly, while “ethnicity” remained the same at zero, “education” and “demographics” actually made a negative contribution to the gap’s increase (-7% for education and –17% for demographics). Most of gap’s increase was explained in the “occupation” category, which was as high as 96%. It suggests that the gap in labor productivity between the two areas was widening extensively during the period.
Environment gap: The contribution of this factor to the rural-urban gap’s increase was small (4%). It means that from 1992-93 to 1997-98, the macro-economic environment was slightly distorted in favor of urban areas.
Ø All the three gaps worked in the same direction, raising rural-urban gap from 1992-93 to 1997-98. While the increase in characteristics gap accounted for 24% of the gap’s increase, the remaining 76% was explained by the increase in discrimination (both characteristics and environment gap).
Alone, increase in occupation’s return gap accounted for as much as 96% of the total increase in the gap. Because of this widening productivity gap (due to capital concentration as I will demonstrate in the next Chapter), policy is needed to move labor from low-productivity jobs in rural areas to high-productivity jobs in urban areas. This policy not only makes more efficient use of both labor and capital resources but also prevents rural-urban gap from widening in the future.
Following Lipton’s approach, in this chapter, I will argue that discrimination is mainly derived from government urban-biased policies, which consists of government’s investment strategy and government’s manipulation of price incentives.
Because Vietnamese government plays a crucial role in the investment activity, the allocation of government’s investment has strong impact on the rural-urban gap.
Table 9 shows the allocation of capital between agriculture and industry. In 1997-98, while amounting to 74% of industrial output and 535.6% of industrial employment, net investment in agriculture was much lower than that in industry, at only 16.5% of industrial investment.
|
|
|
1995-96 |
|
|
|
1996-97 |
|
|
|
1997-98 |
|
|
|
Agr. |
In. |
Agr/In Ratio |
|
Agr. |
In. |
Agr/In Ratio |
|
Agr. |
In. |
Agr/In Ratio |
|
GDP |
51282 |
57094 |
89.8% |
|
53539 |
65000 |
82.3% |
|
55895 |
75473 |
74.0% |
|
Employment |
24765 |
4375 |
566% |
|
24775 |
4417 |
560.9% |
|
24814 |
4633 |
535.6% |
|
Social
Net investment |
3622.6 |
19399.4 |
18.6% |
|
3530 |
19817.3 |
17.8% |
|
3761.8 |
22834.1 |
16.5% |
Source: General
Statistical Office
Unit: GDP in billion VND; Employment in thousand; Social net investment in billion VND
As too much investment was concentrated in industry, the law of diminishing return implies that the return to that investment may be very low, making the investment inefficient. ICOR is the most widely-used indicator to assess the efficiency of the above capital allocation (Harrod-Domard, Lipton). Looking at Figure 3, too much government investment in industry has severely lowered the return to investment, raising the ICOR index in industry. Consequently, ICOR in industry was more than four times higher than ICOR in agriculture. This meant that one unit of capital could raise about four times more output if invested in agriculture rather than in industry.
Figure 3: ICOR and Government Investment

Source: Government
investment (billion VND) is from General Statistical Office.
ICOR is author’s calculation basing on Table 9.
Ø Clearly, by shifting capital investment from agriculture to industry, government can raise total national output. However, in practice government shows a strong bias toward industry. In 1997-98, government investment in industry was nearly double that in agriculture (Figure 3). Such high level of investment in industry, especially in heavy industry, was usually justified by dynamic efficiency hypothesis, which argued that although the short-run yield from such investment may be low, this investment will lay the basis for long-term growth. However, when investing in industry, Vietnamese government was more influenced by group interest rather than dynamic efficiency (Dollar, Jennie 1998).
According to Lewis’s dualistic theory, economic growth can be achieved if there is continuous movement of surplus labor from rural to urban areas. However, during 1992-1998, while industrial output growth averaged 13 percent annually, industrial employment growth was only 4 percent, less than 30% of the industrial output growth. This Figure was as high as 80% for other NIC countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). So, despite rapid growth, industry has failed to absorb surplus labors in rural agriculture.
The growth pattern of industry is the main reason for the above consequence. Table 10 provides a sectoral breakdown of top industrial projects to be implemented in 1996-2000 period. All of the projects were in heavy industry and very capital intensive, accounting for approximately 40% of total government investment in industrial sector.
|
Sector |
Number of projects |
Total investment |
|
Top
industrial projects |
|
|
|
Oil
and gas |
2 |
15.07 |
|
Chemical
and fertilizer |
4 |
9.35 |
|
Steel |
5 |
37.61 |
|
Cement |
9 |
17.95 |
|
|
S=20 |
S=79.98 |
|
Total
investment in industrial sector |
|
194.50 |
Source: Public Investment Program 1996-2000, June 1996 Unit: VND trillion
Ø Because of the government concentration of investment in heavy industry, urban workers will be equipped with more capital, resulting in high labor productivity and high wage. In contrast, rural farmers, unable to move to industrial production, struggle with one another for limited land and capital, resulting in low labor productivity and low income. When rural labor is unable to shift from low-productivity work in agriculture to high-productivity work in industry, this is a loss to national output.
While urban infrastructure is in rather good condition, rural infrastructure is generally underdeveloped. According to UNDP, some 20% of communes in the Northern Mountainous region are reported to lack motorable roads, and about 30% of district and 50% of commune roads are estimated to be impassable in the wet season (UNDP 1998). However, rural transportation seems not to be a government priority. For the state investment program during 1996-2000, most transportation investment focused on the three developed centers (Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Quang Nam-Da Nang), only 5% was left for investment in rural transportation.
Although part of the government agenda, rural electrification is still a big problem. Nearly 6 million Vietnamese households or 30 million people in rural areas have no access to electricity (author’s estimates from VLSS-2). Thus, urban people (20% of total population) consumed 86% of total electricity, they also paid less than half per unit in comparison with rural consumers (UNDP 1999). Because electricity is critical input into production process, restricted access to electricity has created a serious impediment to rural development.
While nearly 100% of urban people had access to clean water, only 32% of rural people had access to clean water, of which only 5% had running water. Unclean water was considered as an important cause leading to high death rate among rural children under 5 years old, amounting to 25% of total deaths (UNDP 1999).
Ø As government is nearly exclusive provider of infrastructure, poor rural infrastructure clearly reflects the disproportionate government investment between rural and urban areas, although return from rural investment in infrastructure is as high as 20-35% (WB 1998). Such high rates of return strongly suggest that infrastructure acts as a crucial bottleneck in rural economic development. Therefore, some reallocations of infrastructure investment from urban to rural areas will surely raise total output for the whole economy.
To understand the impact of the exchange rate on rural-urban gap in Vietnam, two questions need to be answered: Firstly, what is the share of each area in import and export activities? Secondly, is the real exchange rate over-valued or under-valued?
Figure 4 provides some implications about the share of rural/ urban areas in import-export activities. Excluding the small share of “fertilizer”, imports of “consumer goods”, “fuels & raw material”, and “machinery & equipment” mainly serve urban consumption and urban industry. In the period 1992-93 to 1997-98, “fertilizer” import annually accounted for less than 5%, while the rest of 95% mainly went to urban consumption and urban industry.
Source: General
Statistical Office
|
Import |
|
Export |
A different pattern exists for export activities. “Agriculture” export had the biggest share of 45% from 1992-93 to 1997-98, while “heavy industry & mineral” had the smallest share of 27.7%. So rural areas appeared to dominate in export activities and urban areas appeared to dominate in import activities
The exchange rate in 1992 is usually used as the benchmark because at that time economic reform almost completed, and a large devaluation consistent with the state of current account has already occurred (Duc and Thu 1995; Le 1995).

Source: Author’s
calculation basing on GSO’s data, 1999
Figure 5 shows that while nominal exchange rate remained rather stable over the period, the real exchange rate (REER) sharply declined. It meant that Vietnamese currency has been increasingly over-valued over the period. As mentioned above, in Vietnam rural areas dominated in exports and urban areas dominated in imports, so that urban areas would benefit from the over-valued exchange rate at the cost of rural areas, income was transferred from rural to urban areas.
Ø Let alone, the exchange rate automatically tends to its equilibrium value although there may be some fluctuation in the short-run, so the persistent over-valuation can only be caused by government intervention (Montiel, Hinkle 1999). Aiming at rapid industrialization, the Vietnamese government has tried to over-value VND to make imports of machinery and materials cheaper for urban industry. However, this came at the expense of rural exports. As Bate (1981:76) said, “under overvalued exchange rate environment, urban businesses prosper at the expense of rural ones”.
The salient feature of Vietnam’s tariff schedule is the highly complex structure with many different rates leading to excessively high protection. However, different activities have quite different levels of protection. The Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) is the most widely used indicator to compare the tariff protection across economic activities.
|
|
Unweighted
ERP |
Import
weighted ERP |
Product
weighted ERP |
ERP
with product weighted for output and import weighted for input |
|
Economy |
47.6% |
47.1% |
48.1% |
52.0% |
|
Agriculture |
10.1% |
9.0% |
10.4% |
11.6% |
|
Industry 1 (Intermediate products) |
26.5% |
26.2% |
31.5% |
36.5% |
|
Industry 2 (Consumer products) |
96.4% |
95.8% |
92.1% |
96.2% |
Source: IDRC, 1999 “The Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection by Industry in Vietnam”.
In Table 11, the ERPs for agriculture are much lower than the national average, only around 10% for all measurements. ERPs for industries producing intermediate goods are averaged at around 30%. High and very high ERPs are observed for industries producing consumer goods averaging to between 92.1%-96.2%.
Ø Tariff protection will cause a deadweight loss to the national economy. However, as the level of protection for the whole economy is mainly explained by the ERPs for urban industry, the urban areas still gain somewhat while rural areas suffer most of the loss. Specifically, (i) prices of industrial products are raised relatively higher than prices of agricultural products, leading to negative price scissors against rural farmers. (ii) Private investment such as FDI and domestic investment will tend to flow into protected industry instead of agriculture (around 65% total FDI occurred in the industrial products with the effective rate of protection above 60%, CIE 1998).
While industrial products for exports receive a lot of government favors, most major agricultural exports like rice, coffee, agro-forest must abide by export quotas.
Due to export quotas, rural producers of agricultural products suffer lower domestic price (from Pw to Pd), and lower quantity of exports. In contrast, urban consumers benefit from the lower price. The whole society pays a deadweight loss for this rural-urban resource transfer. To understand in greater detail the above rural-urban resource transfer from export quotas, it is necessary to focus on a single product, and rice exports are usually selected.
Here I would like to reinterpret the results from “Rice Market Monitoring and Policy Option Study” (ADB 1996). Table 12 summarizes the effects of eliminating rice export quota.
|
Measurement |
With quota |
Without quota |
Value change |
Percent |
|
Rice price (D/kg) |
2771 |
3319 |
548 |
19.8 % |
|
Value export (US $ m) |
681 |
1526 |
845 |
124.1 % |
|
Total household income (US $ m/yr) |
13514 |
14446 |
932 |
6.9 % |
Source: ADB, 1996 “Rice Market
Monitoring and Policy Option Study”
According to the study, without the quota, the retail price of rice increases 19.8%. In response to the more attractive prices, rice production expands 11.5%, and domestic consumption reduces by 13.7%. The combined effects are dramatic increase in export value from 681 million to 1.526 billion USD. Total household income rises 6.9% or 932 million USD. In other word, with the imposition of rice quota, Vietnamese households lose 932 million USD in 1995.
That is the nation-wide effect from the elimination of export quota, Table 13 shows the benefit and loss accrued to each group of population. In the Table, the “direct effect” is the immediate effect of rice price increase on income. Then, increase in farmer’s income will have “feedback” on the rest of the economy; the “total effect” measures the change in income of both the direct and feedback effect.
|
Population
Sector |
Direct Effect |
Total Effect |
|
National average |
0.4 |
4.9 |
|
Urban sector |
-2.9 |
1.3 |
|
Rural sector |
1.1 |
5.7 |
Source: ADB, 1996 “Rice Market
Monitoring and Policy Option Study”
Although, average household gains from quota elimination, there is substantial variation across groups. Urban sector suffers immediately from the direct effect of rice price increase (-2.9%). However, taking into account the feedback effect, the total effect on urban areas is positive (1.3%). Rural households benefit the most, with 1.1% for the direct effect and 5.7% for the total effect.
Ø National food security is the basic rationale for the imposition of the rice export quota. However, it is achieved at considerable cost to rural farmers. Because nearly 70% of rural people depend on agriculture as the main source of income, and rice accounts for 50% of total agricultural income (author’s estimates from VLSS-2), rice export quota is a big constraint to rural welfare improvement, especially for poverty reduction efforts. The Vietnamese government should reconsider its policy toward rice export quotas. Food security for urban areas should not be put at higher priority than huge rural loss.
Recognizing the important role of rural-urban gap in sustaining social stability, maintaining economic growth and alleviating poverty, the thesis has made some attempts to analyze the degree and the causes for the rural-urban gap in Vietnam. Following are the main findings from the thesis.
Whatever methods we took to measure rural-urban gap, there was always big gap between the two areas. Urban people were significantly better off than rural people across regions, across economic activities, across ethnic groups, and across educational levels.
Using econometrics, the above gap is decomposed into two factors: characteristics gap and discrimination. The results from decomposition make clear about the fallacy in the normal thinking of some people when they claimed that higher urban living standard was fair. Their justification has rested on arguments that urban people are endowed with favorable characteristics such as higher grades of education, concentrating in high-productivity jobs, less children, more adults and so on. This type of argument merely reflects a third of the rural-urban gap (37.03%), the rest -as much as 62.97%- is explained by discrimination.
By concentrating investment in urban areas and distorting rural-urban price incentives, government’s policies are the underlying causes for the above discrimination. (i) In terms of the government’s investment strategy, obvious imbalances are observed in various fields such as: industry versus agriculture, heavy industry versus light industry, and urban infrastructure versus rural infrastructure. (ii) In terms of the rural-urban price incentives, they are severely distorted in favor of urban areas, examples of these are overvalued exchange rate, rice export quota and high tariff protection for industrial products.
Surprisingly, none of these government’s policies pass the efficiency or equity criteria as Lipton said, “Resource allocations, within the city and the village as well as between them reflect urban priorities rather than equity or efficiency” (Lipton 1977:56). It meant that these policies create some benefit to urban people, but the resulting loss to rural areas is far greater. By reversing its policies and shifting some resources from urban to rural areas, Vietnamese government will surely achieve both rapid economic growth and moderate rural-urban gap.
