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Summary of Thesis

Introduction

Have emphasized the role of money and finance in economic development, Government of Vietnam tries to improve household's access to financial services. It is thought that households benefit from financial services. Target to improve household’s access to credit, Government has established development financial institutions as well as credit programs and pursed subsidized interest rate and priority lending policies. However, the number of household gained access to credit is still limited. It was that 49.3 percent of households get access to credit in period 1992-1993. Of borrowers, only 22.52 percent could access to formal credit, while 77.48 percent relied on informal credit. After five years, the situation has not been significantly improved. In period 1997-1998, there had 50.3 percent of  households could access to credit. Of borrowers, only about 22 percent obtained loans from formal financial sector while the others still have to take loans from informal financial sector [1]. This result may disappoint policymakers. It explicitly indicates that in spire of Government's efforts a large number of households fail to access to credit, especially to formal financial institutions.

Seeking answers for the question that why a large number of households do not get access to credit, particularly to formal credit, many researchers concentrate on this area of research. Their findings contribute to enrich our knowledge on credit market and borrowing by households in Vietnam. However, the previous works concentrate on either informal credit market (Le T.T and et al in 1999, and Do .Q.T in 2000) or rural household credit market. (Tran T.D. in 1998)

Apparently, characteristics of urban household and condition of urban credit market are likely much different from that of rural households and that of rural credit market. So, borrowing by urban households may be different from that by rural households. Up to now, however, there has not been any study that emphasizes merely on urban credit market in Vietnam. Therefore, our understanding on urban credit market is extremely limited. In attempting to fill this gap, our research takes a study of urban credit market with focusing on borrowing by urban households. The core objective of this study is to find an answer for the central research question

·         What are determinants of borrowing by urban households?

The research analyzes the relationship between urban households and credit market to find out relation of characteristics and endowment of urban households and characteristics of loan to chance to borrow, loan amount and source of loan. Therefore, the research concentrates on three aspects of borrowing by urban households, including determinants of the probability to borrow, the determinants of loan amount, the determinants of loan sources. In identifying the determinants of borrowing by urban households, the research expects to find out major constraints for urban households’  access to formal financial institutions.    

In addressing research question, qualitative method is used, including statistical and descriptive analysis, review of historical trends, and comparative methods. Apart form, quantitative method is extensively used.

Data used in the analysis extracts from the VLSS that was conducted by General Statistics Office with the technical assistance of World Bank. 

The research includes five chapters. In exclusion of chapter of introduction, four other chapters present our investigation and findings. Chapter 2 represents an analytical framework. Chapter 3 provides an overview of urban credit market and borrowing by urban households in Vietnam. Chapter 4 is devoted to testing hypothesis. Chapter 5 represents a summary of our findings. It also discuss policy implications of findings.

 

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

1.1.Major concepts

Household is area of concern in social science. Concept of household is defined and discussed by economists, feminists and anthropologists. Ringen (1991) defines of household that as is a group of at least two people pools their incomes and uses income collectively (Adam, 1996). However, there is much controversy over the boundary of this definition. Generally, economists view household as an essential unit of analysis and develop theory based on modeling behavior of household. There are two themes of economic model of household behavior. The first treats consumption and production separately or simultaneously in an integrated model. The second emphasizes on market condition, and relationship between household and market for land, labor, and credit.

Borrowing is one side of credit [2]. In general, borrowing is defined as that to be transferred property right on a given object (e.g. sum of money) in exchange for implementing obligation of a claim on specified object (e.g. a certain sum of money) at specified point of time in the future[3]. In extension of this definition, borrowing by households, particularly urban household is defined as activities of households to obtain external resources to support other household activities with obligation to repay in future. In other way, borrowing is made by household to finance household's budget deficit.

Household credit market the presence of heterogeneity among different household induces to situation whereby households fall into budget deficit while some others are in budget surplus. Therefore, the deficit households desire to borrow in order to cover their deficit while surplus households also desire to lend out for their interest. Consequently, household credit market is established to facilitate borrowing and lending of households. Credit market functions to transfer purchasing power from surplus households to deficit ones by issuing and acquiring of money-denominated debt.

1.2.Theoretical model

The basic model

The basic model based on assumptions that there is a household lives in two periods within a perfect market. The household has a inter-temporal utility function and behaves rationally. The household choose to consume at the levels that maximize its utility overtime. If its current income is less than its current consumption, the household must borrow to obtain higher level of utility.         

Generally, the basic model indicates the factors affecting household demand for loan are current consumption level, income and asset. It implies that the demand of household for loan is function of household asset, income and consumption. Their relationships are showed in the following equation.

Where A1 is initial amount of assets; Y1 is the current income; Y2 is future income; and r is market rate of interest. The equation explicitly indicates that the demand of households for loan rises if  preference for current consumption being high or expected income increasing or amount of initial assets and current income as well as interest rates dropping.

Thus, the basic model shows that borrowing, along with saving, allows the household to smooth its consumption path and to maximize its utility overtime.

The extended model

In extension of the basic model, such factors as household resources, activities and flows of resources are included to identify determinants of the demand of households for loan; and some assumptions are changed. The model shows that the demand of urban households for loan increases with its liquidity requirements for activities. Level of household budget deficit determines the level of borrowing,.B = dR - åYj + å Fg .  Where B is the level of borrowing; dR is the change in assets; Yi is income i th of the household; and Fg is the outflow of expenditure to finance activity g th. 

Increases in such household activities as consumption, production and investment create increasing outflows of household resources. If inflow of resources from income generating activities and assets would not meet outflows, demand for loan may rise. The above equation shows that the demand of the household for credit appears when flows of income and changes in household's resources do not meet demand for funding the household activities.

Hence, the demand for loan appears and rises when household deficit gap appears and broadens. The demand of the household for loan  is determined by household resources  and activities.

1.3.Issues in credit market

Credit rationing is a condition of loan market in which the lender supply of fund is less than borrower demand at the quoted contract term. In other words, it means that there is excess demand. In credit market, credit rationing appears to be an inefficient situation of credit market, where interest rate does not work well to balance supply and demand sides.

There are two major ways to explore causes of credit rationing. Firstly, traditional views consider credit rationing resulted from government interventions on credit market by imposing interest rate ceiling on lending institutions. Interest rate is exogenously held under market clearing level. With interest rate keep artificially low, some potential borrowers who want to borrow are rationed.  Secondly, after the demise of the traditional theories, a new approach to credit rationing was developed. The new approach argued that permanent credit rationing is considered as an equilibrium phenomenon rather than a temporary phenomenon. Modern theories identify problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in credit market as a source of credit rationing when information is distributed asymmetrically among market participants.

Fragmentation of credit market strongly affects the borrowing behaviors of urban households. Fragmentation of credit market, firstly, is thought as a consequence of the repressive government policy. Ceiling rate on deposit and loan rate imposed by central bank induces to severe credit rationing in formal financial sector. Resulting from inter-linkage between formal and informal financial markets the unsatisfied demand of households for formal loan flows into informal financial sector and put demand for informal loans to rise up. Secondly, it is viewed that fragmentation of household credit market is caused by structural and institutional features of credit market in developing countries. In addition, fragmentation of credit market may also result from weakness in the infrastructure that supports the financial system.  Thirdly, another perspective on fragmentation of credit market argues that formal and informal financial sectors are parallel developed because they serve different segments of credit market.

In conclusion, under perfect credit market, borrowing, along with saving, allows urban households to maximize their utility overtime. Resources or endowments, incomes, and activities of households determine the demand for loan. The effects of those factors on the demand of urban households for credit are called "demand side effects". On the other hand, credit market conditions and relationship between urban households and financial intermediaries affect borrowing by urban households. If credit market is inefficient, some of potential household borrowers fail to access to credit market. Therefore, severity of credit rationing is an explanation for credit constraint of urban households; and high fragmentation of credit market is an explanation for various borrowing behaviors of urban households. Borrowing by urban households is substantially determined by condition of credit market so called "supply side effects". Thus, borrowing by urban households is jointly affected by both demand and supply side factors.

 

Chapter 2: An overview of urban financial system and borrowing by urban households in Vietnam

2.1.Financial system and source of credit to urban households in Vietnam

Although Vietnam's financial system has been substantially reformed since 1988, the financial system is still underdeveloped. The banking based system is dominated by state owned banks, while non-bank financial institutions and security market is relatively small. The weaknesses of financial system may be worsened by some special characteristics. Firstly,  since the economy is in transition from plan to market economy, there are many significantly institutional weaknesses not only in the economy as a whole but also in the financial market. Secondly, Vietnam’s financial system displays similar characteristics of financial system of developing countries. For instance, credit market is monopolistic by state owned banks; credit market is incomplete; and some market is missing like credit insurance market. Thirdly, following repressive financial policy, Government has been taking strictly control over interest rates and operations of banking sector. Therefore, interest rates have been kept under the market clearing rates; and extension of credit is biased towards priority sectors.

The urban credit market is highly fragmented. The Formal and informal sectors co-exist.  The formal financial sector includes government banks, private banks, and credit cooperatives and credit schemes. Among the formal financial institutions, VBA and VBP are the two largest sources of formal loans but concentrate on rural households rather than urban households. On the hand, the informal financial sector includes private moneylenders, relatives and friends, ROSCA and other individuals. They have been active in the credit market. 

2.2.Overview of borrowing by urban households

Analysis of household data brings overview of borrowing by urban household in Vietnam. Only 35.8 percent of urban households participated borrowing with average size of loan being 7,916 thousands of dong. The proportion of urban households borrowed and loan size varied across the country as well as expenditure quintiles and reaches to the top in Northern Upland and lowest quintile. Among the cities, the proportion of households borrowed was the lowest in Hanoi, however, the average size of loan was the highest.    

On average, credit programs were the cheapest source of loan(0.88 percent per month), while private moneylenders were the most expensive one (4.45percent per month). As a whole, interest rates of formal loans are far lower than that of informal loans (3.69 versus 1.25 percent per month ). Interest rate gap was 2.44 percent per month on average.

Similarities to rural households, however, urban households still relied mainly on the informal financial sector (77.4 percent in term of loan value). Of the informal sector, HO/Hui and other individuals were major sources( 53.4 percent). Of  the formal sector, government banks were largest suppliers (72.9 percent). Surprisingly, urban households undertook large loans from the informal financial sector instead of the formal financial sector  (8,866.2 versus 5,700 thousand dong).

Also, urban households have a variety of loan purposes. Of  loan purposes, loans for production and housing makes up the largest share (82 percent). To finance housing and durable goods, urban households get loans mainly from the informal financial sector (86 percent). Interestingly, although the formal sector concentrates on production loans, the urban households still rely mainly in the informal sector to finance working capital(53 percent).  

Moreover, average size of loan sharply increased when urban households offered collateral from 7,213 to 10,575 thousand dong, especially the size of formal loan from 1,995 to 10,122 thousand dong. There was a big difference between loans with and without collateral in the formal sector. Informal loans without collateral made majority (87 percent). 

In addition, borrowing was different from quintile to quintile. The rich households took more loan than the poor ones do. The households in upper and middle quintiles made up 92.8 percent of total loan value, while the lowest and low middle accounted for 3.1 percent.

Finally, in consideration of borrowing by urban households across the country, it become apparent that the proportion of urban households in Hochiminh participating in borrowing was the highest and urban households ( 42 percent versus 23 percent). The largest size of loan was in Hanoi on average (11,785 thousand dong). Average sizes of loans in two big cities were much higher than the rest ( 11,785 and 11,649 versus 4,017 thousand dong). Only in other major cities large loans came from the formal financial sector instead of the informal one (4,646 versus 3538 thousand dong).

 

Chapter 3: Model specification, empirical results and interpretation

 

 

3.1.The conceptual borrowing process

Borrowing process of households is divided into two stages. At stage one, the desired households decide whether to apply for loans or not. Base on the demand for fund of the household, and available of information on lenders and their loan conditions, some households decide to apply for loans, so called household applicants for loan. The household applicants based on cost of borrowing as well as their capacity of meeting lender's requirements rationally decide sources of credit to apply for loan. On the other hand, some the other households who desired to borrow do not apply because they expected that they would not be able to satisfy lender's requirements, called self-ration households.  At stage two, in screening process, lenders choose to make loan to which the household applicants. Usually, lenders base on characteristics and endowments of urban households, as well as their relations to household applicants to justify creditworthy. Lender extent credits only to the urban households with "reasonable" creditworthy. The household who applied for loan but being rejected seem to be completely rationed while the other households who are accepted by lenders but do not obtain desired amount seem to be partial ration. The households who obtained their desired loan amount stop their applying process; meanwhile the households who are completely rationed or partial rationed by first lenders would either continue or stop their applying process.

Hypothesis

The above analytical ground proposes that characteristics, endowments of households and loan characteristics would determine borrowing by households. Therefore, the following hypotheses are raised.

Hypothesis 1: The probability to borrow of urban households, B, would depend on characteristics of and endowments of the urban household.

(B)=f (vector of household characteristics, vector of household endowments)

Hypothesis 2: for households borrowers, loan amount or level of borrowing, LA, would depend on characteristics and endowments of household, and characteristics of loan.

LA = f (vector of household endowments, vector of household characteristics, vector of loan characteristics)               Subject to B=1

Hypothesis 3: Observable characteristics of and endowments of household borrowers would affect the choice for source of loan as well as decisions of lenders.

SOL = f (vector of loan characteristic, vectors of household characteristics, vector of household endowments)

 

3.2. Determinants of the probability to borrow of urban households

Econometric Model  

B = a0 + a1SEX + a2AGE + a3HEDU + a4HHSIZE + a5LASTEDU + a6CUREDU + a7HOUSEVAL +     a8DURABLE + a9OCC_WAGE + a10OCC_SELF + a11HHEXPE + a12MEDEXP + a13HOCHI + a14OTHER +  '

The estimated results

Table 3.1

Estimation results of the model of the determinants of probability to borrow

 

Explanatory variables

Coefficients

(Probit regression)

Coefficients

(Tobit regression)

Sex

      -.1215***

      -.1295***

Age

  -.0130*

  -.0136*

Hedu

 .0014

 .0015

Hhsize

.1022*

.1009*

Lastedu

   -.1707**

     -.1993***

Curedu

      .0554***

      .0604***

Hhexpe

  -.0102*

 -.0103*

Medexpe

   .0503*

 .0398*

Houseval

 .0001

.0001

Durable

   -.0029**

    - .0029***

Occ_self

 .0270

.0270

Occ_wage

-.0080

-.0116

Hochi

    .2013**

   .2075**

Other

    .1826**

   .1890**

_Cons

-.1456

-.0474

Pseudo

.06

.05

Number of observation are 1713 *,**, and *** significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively.   Notes: See Appendix 3  for details 

Interpretation

Empirical results show that age and sex of household head significantly affect the probability of urban households to borrow but negative sign is unexpected. In addition, household size is significant predictors. The probability of urban household borrowed rises if household size increases. Also, the probability to borrow increases when the number of households attending school increases. Moreover, endowments of urban households are important determinants of the probability of urban household borrowed.  Unexpectedly, number of household members finished university and durable value, however, negatively associate with the probability of urban household to borrow. Nevertheless, significant relationship between household expenditures and borrowing by urban households is found. The probability of urban household to borrow increase when its medical expense rises. Finally, household location strongly affects the probability to borrow of urban households.

4.2. Determinants of loan amount

Model

LA = b0 + b1SEX + b2AGE + b3HEDU + b4HHSIZE + b5LASTEDU+  b6CUREDU + b7HHEXPE + b8MEDEXPE +  b9HOUSEVAL + b10DURABLE   b11OCC-SELF +  b12OCC_WAGE + b13PRODU + b14COL +  b15HOCHI + b16OTHER +  '

The estimated results

 

Table 3.2

Estimation results of the model of the determinants of loan mount

 

Independent variables

Coefficients

Coefficients

Sex

-1 117.218

-675.809

Age

-208.706**

-90.682***

Hedu

257.202*

276.0172***

Hhsize

  1 109.915*

204.273**

Lastedu

-1 795.214

-1 819.586

Curedu

315.107

509.036

Hhexpe

95.508**

142.272*

Medexpe

255.368

42.944

Houseval

            1.756

1.283

Durable

          -41.904

19.185

Occ_self

932.051*

1 436.44*

Occ_wage

           53.45

339.779

Col

 

12 799.33*

Produ

 

20 890.24*

Hochi

   4 940.682*

1 138.547*

Other 

  3 013.229

3 986.039

Cons

-22 919.58

-19 690.23

R-square

.1601

.1821

Number of observations are 1713; *, and ** indicate significant at the 1, and 5 percent level

Notes: See Appendix 4 for details

 

Interpretation

The second model attempts to prove that characteristics and endowments of household, and loan characteristics determine loan amounts borrowed. Empirical results show that better educated household head, the more loan amount urban households take. Besides, age of households negatively associates with loan amount  Household size and numbers of dependants are significant determinants of loan amount. Apart form, household expenditure is another significant determinant of loan amount. If households expenditure rises, loan amount rise.  Occupation of household members also affect loan amount. If household has more self-employed member, loan amount rises. Loan security is important determinant of loan amount. If urban households offered collateral, loan amount borrowed by urban household increase significantly. Apart from, a significant relationship between loan uses and loan amount was found. If urban households take loans for production , loan amounts rise sharply.. Finally, if the urban households live in Hochiminh city, loan amounts borrowed sharply increase.                       

4.3. Determinants of formal loan source

Econometric Model

SOL = b0 + b1 SEX + b2 AGE+ b3 HEDU + b4 HHSIZE + b5 LASTEDU + b6MEDEXPE + b7HHEXPE +  b8OCC_SELF + b9 OCC_WAGE + b10HOUSEVAL + b11DURABLE +  b12PRODU + b13HOUSEBUI + b14COL + b15 LSIZE + b16 MATURITY +  b17HOCHI + b18 OTHER +   '

The estimated results

Table 3.3 Estimation results of the determinants of  source of loan

Variable

 

 (Formal sector)

 (Relatives, friends, other individuals)

Sex